

Building Trust and Collaborating with Others: Challenges For A Sustainable Peace in Caquetá, Colombia

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Abstract

In the Amazonian department of Caquetá (Colombia), considered a Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) stronghold, 300 families are currently challenged with implementing the peace agreement in their territory while also navigating the road to sustainable development. This process entails trusting others, collaborating, and making decisions about health and education services, environmental problems, economic issues, and even aspects of everyday life. The Paisajes Conectados program is focused on reducing deforestation and promoting sustainable development in two municipalities of Caquetá. Its mission is to build new skills and share knowledge within local communities in order to strengthen governance and participation. This paper presents the findings of a field practicum, developed with the objective of determining community perceptions of the Capacity Building and Governance Strategy implemented under the Paisajes Conectados program in the context of a transition from conflict to peace.

Author's Note

What is at the heart of peace-building after five decades of violence and civil war in Colombia? A peace agreement signed between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerillas is shifting the power balance in many regions of the country. Through demobilization and disarmament, FARC has abandoned its long-standing role as a powerful referee of economic, social and political affairs in certain regions. Simultaneously, the Colombian State intends to enter regions where distrust is prevalent due to decades of federal neglect. In the Amazonian department of Caquetá, considered a FARC stronghold, 300 families are currently faced with implementing the peace agreement in their territory while also forging the road to sustainable development. This process entails trusting others, collaborating, and making long-term decisions about health and education services, environmental problems, and economic issues alongside daily complications. The Paisajes Conectados (Connected Landscapes) program, implemented by the Colombian NGO Fondo Acción in 2013, focuses on reducing deforestation and promoting sustainable development in two municipalities of Caquetá. The program

aims to build new skills and share knowledge within the local communities in order to strengthen governance and participation. This paper presents the findings of a field practicum, developed with the objective of determining community perceptions of the Capacity Building and Governance Strategy implemented under the Paisajes Conectados program in the context of a transition from conflict to peace. Governance refers to the set of rules that communities require and utilize in order to make their own decisions.

Among other results, the practicum revealed that communities in Caquetá identify the need to develop skills for conflict resolution, cooperation and teamwork, and the need to strengthen mechanisms for participation in the agreements that are relevant to their lives and territory. These results might help the national government implement the peace agreement in the region and achieve Goal 16 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) - Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions.

Introduction

Colombia and conflict have historically gone hand in hand. Even though the country elected the first democratic government in South America, 150 of the 200 years since Simon Bolívar and his army gained independence from Spain have been scarred by civil strife (Killcullen and Milles 2015). In 1819, when Colombia gained independence, the new nation was politically divided between Centralists and Federalists, led by Bolívar and fellow patriot Santander respectively. These factions gradually evolved into the Conservative and Liberal parties by the 1840s. Both blocs spent most of the 19th and half of the 20th centuries struggling for political power (Killcullen and Milles 2015). The confrontation reached a critical point in 1948 when Jorge Eliecer Gaitán, a populist politician running as Liberal presidential candidate, was murdered. The magnicide sparked a dark period called “*La Violencia*” (Killcullen and Milles 2015) that took the lives of some 300,000 people and displaced thousands from rural areas to the main cities (Killcullen and Milles 2015).

In an attempt to end the conflict, Liberals and Conservatives signed a covenant in 1956 where both parties agreed to share power (Killcullen and Milles 2015). Though the period dubbed the National Front (1958-1974) quelled violence, it also blocked political pluralism, failed to deliver equity, and generated widespread discontent. “Colombia’s temperate, urbanized, populated, developed center contrasted with its tropical, rural, sparsely inhabited, neglected periphery. Structural inequality and lack of opportunity created a fertile ground for revolutionaries seeking to overthrow the system.” (Killcullen and Milles 2015, 118). By 1964, in the middle of the political truce, Colombia had two major guerrilla groups: the Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the Maoist National Liberation Army (ELN). Moreover, under the claim of electoral fraud in the 1970 elections (the last held under the National Front), a new urban guerilla group, the M-19, entered the scene.

According to these groups, armed struggle to achieve social justice was their only recourse. They financed subversion through kidnapping, extortion, and bank assaults, and by the 1980s began “taxing” coca crops (Killcullen and Milles 2015). It didn’t take long for FARC and the paramilitary armies to connect with the complex network that produced and exported cocaine to the US and Europe (Killcullen and Milles 2015).¹

Participation in the drug trade meant growth for the illegal armies and a significant escalation of the armed conflict. By the last decade of the 20th century, violence, drugs, and social injustice painted Colombia as a failed state (Killcullen and Milles 2015). FARC controlled large swaths of the country including two of the biggest regions, Meta and Caquetá. In 2002, following a failed peace negotiation process with FARC, President Andrés Pastrana negotiated “Plan Colombia”, a US-backed military and intelligence strategy aimed at strengthening the rule of law and combating FARC

¹ Some of the first paramilitary forces were created during the 1960s by the Colombian military as part of its counterinsurgency efforts. Subsequently, many paramilitary forces trace their development to wealthy landowners, drug traffickers, multinational corporations, members of the security forces, and politicians.

and other illegal groups. President Álvaro Uribe Vélez continued the plan for eight more years, delivering accurate blows and debilitating FARC and other sources of violence and destabilization (Killcullen and Milles 2015).

However, the conflict was not over and the military, social, and economic costs were becoming unsustainable. When President Juan Manuel Santos took office in 2010, he focused on finding a “third way” out of a conflict that had given the country a shameful record (Santos 2014). “After Syria, Colombia has the world’s largest number of internally displaced people. This has bred food insecurity and loss of livelihoods; it is associated with child labor, school desertion and sexual exploitation – as well as the recruitment by armed groups of thousands of mostly indigenous children” (World Food Programme 2016).

The Peace Process

“The word is ‘opportunity’. We must not limit peace to the silence of the rifles. The most remarkable issue is that today there are new opportunities to believe in, create, and re–construct ourselves through dialogue and respect.”

Humberto de la Calle, Head of the Colombian Negotiation Team, 2016

The Colombian government negotiated a peace accord with FARC, a process that took four years beginning in March 2011. “Initial contacts [were] kept confidential to protect [the] process’s early viability” (de la Calle 2016). With a defined agenda, the negotiations went public in October 2012. They would address five topics: rural reform, political participation, illicit drugs, victims, and the end of conflict. The agenda also involved the design of a transitional justice to deal with war crimes, as well as measures to implement, verify, and endorse the process (Peace Government Team Colombia 2016).

Negotiations ended successfully in August 2016, and the peace agreement was presented to Colombian citizens and international authorities (Peace Government Team Colombia 2016). For the first time in 52 years of continuous war against FARC, an opportunity to believe in peace was possible. However, a majority of the citizens voted against the subsequent referendum to ratify and implement the agreement, due to concerns about the treatment of the rebels (Reiter 2016). According to opponents of the peace agreement, “The justice components of the peace agreement, which centered on truth, reconciliation and reintegration, rather than solely on trials, were tantamount to allowing rebels to get away with murder” (Reiter 2016). After a month of re-negotiation, FARC, the government, and some opponents of the initial agreement reached a “new final accord” that improved legal provisions, defined crimes that would be dealt with by special judges, and provided clarity on how FARC would transform into a political party (Peace Government Team Colombia 2016).

The Department of Caquetá

Caquetá has a total area of 88,965 square kilometers (four times the state of New Jersey), and a population of 465,477, 46% of whom are between the ages of 15–44, and of which 80% live in rural areas (Caqueta Government 2014). The life

expectancy is 69.6 years for men and 64.9 years for women, and the population growth rate is 12.93% (Caqueta Government 2014). Less than half of Caqueteños (46.2%) have finished elementary school, and only 35.8% have graduated from high school. Barely 30% of those living in rural areas have full access to public services like sanitation, electricity, and potable water (Caqueta Government 2014). As of 2015, 41.3% of the population was living in poverty – 117,315 more than reported in 2014 (Valencia 2016).

The department's heterogeneous population is composed mostly of *colonos*: displaced families from nearby Andean departments (Huila and Tolima, for example) who traveled during the *La Violencia* years to the sparsely populated and “open lands” of Caquetá in search of opportunity (Arcila, et al. 2000). This involuntary migratory process was complemented by state-sponsored colonization. By 1964 the central government, promising land and loans to those who moved to Caquetá, managed to attract large numbers of dispossessed families from other regions. But given the poor quality of the soils, agriculture was not an option for most of those who relocated to Caquetá, and so the colonization attempts were economic failures (Arcila, et al. 2000).


Caquetá has always been in the periphery. The region has historically represented an opportunity to secure property (Arcila, et al. 2000), yet land tenure is uncertain. Moreover, poor soil quality makes producing adequate yields difficult. Most of the region is isolated, as road infrastructure is deficient, and rivers are the main communication routes (Arcila, et al. 2000).

The region's long history of war and pervasive neglect by the central state created a power vacuum that was readily filled by FARC. The rebels took over some of the sixteen municipalities in Caquetá by the late 1970's. They did not face much opposition from locals; instead, they found that most believed in the ideal of an equitable society and blamed the government for their poverty. FARC had an identical speech and used marketing to discredit the government (Arcila, et al. 2000). The rebel army soon became a parallel authority (Arcila, et al. 2000). Nevertheless, over the years some active local civil groups of farmers and ranchers emerged. Rafael Orjuela, a community leader from Cartagena del Chairá, recalls that “in the times of the guerilla, we had the initiative of creating a manual that contained sixteen environmental provisions ranging from prohibiting logging on river banks to barring entry to the reserve zones that we the communities had created” (Semana Sostenible 2017).

During the 1980s and 1990s, the insurgent illegal army built up its presence in the region. They recruited adults and children from rural areas, cultivated and protected coca crops, charged coca paste “taxes”, opened and controlled cocaine trade routes, and established connections with drug kingpins (Arcila, et al. 2000). FARC also made alliances with local politicians in order to protect their interests. In several elections, the armed group coerced civilians into voting for their candidates (Nunez and Moreno n.d.) while also kidnapping, threatening, or murdering political rivals (Arcila, et al. 2000). According to official data, internal conflict victims in Caquetá total 372,661 (Ciro 2016). These include victims of homicide, forced displacement and kidnapping. The graph below shows how, at the end of the 20th century and in the

early 21st century, both displacement (purple) and kidnapping (green) ravaged the department.

Figure 1: Kidnappings and displacement in Caquetá.



local development. Implementation requires unprecedented levels of participation and consultation with local communities, as decisions over economic, environmental, and social development will have to originate from the bottom up. These new rules will affect the way stakeholders interact, implement changes, and measure impacts on communities.

One of the most significant changes will be FARC’s promise to disarm, demobilize, and instead act politically. *“FARC reiterates its disposition to use only words as a weapon to build the future. Count on us, peace will triumph,”* declared FARC’s top commander Rodrigo Londoño last October (CITATION). If the bells toll for peace, there must be new institutions to direct collaboration, participation, and decision-making in Caquetá and other parts of the country where, until recently, weapons and intimidation have previously prevailed in the absence of the rule of law.

Field practicum approach: Collaborative planning and community capacity building

The peace agreement effectively changes the institutions influencing decision-making, as FARC is no longer the authority in the region. These changes render the traditional decision-making model obsolete, as it assumes the world is rather like a

machine which can be designed to produce particular outputs, when in reality our contemporary society is complex, dynamic and evolving (Innes and Booher 2003, 6). In contrast, the bottom-up collaborative planning process required under the peace agreement is grounded in the belief that local communities know best the multifaceted and fluctuating realities they face (Chambers 1995).

The collaborative planning approach is an effective strategy for dealing with conflict where other practices have failed (Innes and Booher 1999). Collaborative planning is a social response to changing conditions in increasingly networked societies, where differences between communities and individuals are growing, and where accomplishing anything significant requires creating flexible, innovative linkages among many players (Innes and Booher 1999). In this approach, outcome and process are valued in the same way (Innes and Booher 1999), and pluralism is an opportunity for innovation and creativity.

Collaborative planning is based on the idea that solutions can be achieved through dialogue that engages different interests surrounding a task or problem. It requires that every stakeholder is equally informed, willing to listen to the concerns and expectations of others, and respectful of differences (Innes and Booher 1999). This produces two different types of outcomes: tangible and intangible. Tangible results comprise agreements, policies, decisions, strategies, or new ideas for approaching a problem. Intangible outcomes include social and political capital formation, stronger relationships, enhanced trust, a mutual understanding of diverse interests, and thus genuine communication and joint problem solving (Innes and Booher 1999). Often, these intangible results become the foundations for future collaboration.

Community Capacity Building (CCB) is the increase in the ability of community groups to define, assess, analyze, and act on any important matter (Gibbon, Labonte and Laverack 2002). The capacity of a group depends on resource opportunities or constraints (political, ecological, and environmental), and the conditions in which people live (Gibbon, Labonte and Laverack 2002). It is important to understand that “community capacity is neither seen as means or as end, rather it is viewed as both. It is not a substitute for program goals or objectives but it creates a separate set of objectives that run parallel to those of specific programs. This is called a ‘parallel track’ approach in which community capacity is strengthened at each stage of the project.” (Laverack 2005).

Building community capacity is a central and shared concern for funding agencies, implementing organizations and communities because it enables the development, implementation, and maintenance of effective community-based projects (Goodman, et al. 1998). According to Marion Gibbon, Ronald Labonte, and Glenn Laverack (2002), there are nine dimensions that ascertain capacity building in a community (Table 1). These dimensions allow for analysis of community skills, resources and knowledge, and all are equally relevant.

Table 1: Dimensions of community capacity building.

Source: Adapted from Gibbon, Labonte and Laverack, 2002

Domain	Description
Participation	Participation is basic to community empowerment. Only by participating in small groups or larger organisations can individual community members better define, analyse and act on issues of general concern to the broader community.
Leadership	Participation and leadership are closely connected. Leadership requires a strong participant base just as participation requires the direction and structure of strong leadership. Both play an important role in the development of small groups and community organisations.
Organisational structures	Organisational structures in a community include small groups such as committees, and church and youth groups. These are the organisational elements which represent the ways in which people come together in order to socialise, and to address their concerns and problems. The existence of and the level at which these organisations function is crucial to community empowerment.
Problem assessment	Empowerment presumes that the identification of problems, solutions to the problems and actions to resolve the problems are carried out by the community. This process assists communities to develop a sense of self-determination and capacity.
Resource mobilisation	The ability of the community both to mobilise resources from within and to negotiate resources from beyond itself is an important factor in its ability to achieve successes in its efforts.
'Asking why'	The ability of the community to critically assess the social, political, economic and other causes of inequalities is a crucial stage towards developing appropriate personal and social change strategies.
Links with others	Links with people and organisations, including partnerships, coalitions and voluntary alliances between the community and others, can assist the community in addressing its issues.
Role of the outside agents	In a programme context, outside agents are often an important link between communities and external resources. Their role is especially important near the beginning of a new programme, when the process of building new community momentum may be triggered and nurtured. The outside agent increasingly transforms power relationships between her/himself, outside agencies, and the community, such that the community assumes increasing programme authority.
Programme management	Programme management that empowers the community includes the control by the primary stakeholders over decisions on planning, implementation, evaluation, finances, administration, reporting and conflict resolution. The first step toward programme management by the community is to clearly define the roles, responsibilities and line management of all the stakeholders.

The Paisajes Conectados program: An alternative for conservation and sustainability in Caquetá

In 2013, closely following the official launch of peace talks with FARC, Fondo Acción, a Colombian NGO, began implementing the Paisajes Conectados program in Caquetá. The program is based on the assumption that “if provided with alternative sources of income and the appropriate tools for governance, local populations can actively reduce forest clearing and natural habitat degradation.” (Fondo Acción 2015, 3)

To achieve this change, the program has three strategies:

- (i) Reduce deforestation by promoting alternative, profitable, environmentally sound, low-carbon economic options for food sovereignty and sustainable livelihoods in rural communities;
- (ii) Strengthen and empower local civil society and local/regional governments;
- (iii) Create conditions to enable Payments for Environmental Services (PES). PES is an economic mechanism that compensates ecosystem managers for the

conservation of the ecosystems that provide environmental services such as clean water, biodiversity, clean air (Fondo Acción 2015).

Fondo Acción works with fifteen local community-based organizations and external decision makers such as public officials in rural areas of the Solano and Cartagena del Chairá municipalities in Caquetá. The NGO provides support (financial, technical, strategic communications) and stimulates a collaborative planning approach backed by a Community Capacity Building and Governance Strategy (CBGS). The CBGS process involves:

- Determining the need for capacity-building and strengthening in the intervention areas
- Conducting capacity-building activities with individuals and organizations from local communities, NGOs and governments, using the following instruments:
 - Coaching: The Leadership School (Escuela de Líderes) is a coaching program to help community leaders and local teams improve their individual and social communication and organizational skills, build leadership, and create high performance teams
 - Training: Field Schools (Escuelas de Campo), Learning Routes (Giras de Intercambio) and workshops facilitate sharing best practices on issues related to natural resource management, associativity, management, information systems and communal voluntary action
 - Formal education: Community members have access to the Certificate in Rural Development in the Amazon, offered in partnership with Amazonia University
- Creating platforms for civil society participation to facilitate agreements on guidelines and regulations for sustainable management of natural resources between local governments and the community.
- Designing or strengthening mechanisms for sustainable planning and development (Communal Development Plans, Land Management Municipal Plans, Local Community Council Action Plans, Municipal Environmental Agendas and Municipal Development Plans.) (Fondo Acción 2015)

“For over thirty years, FARC rebels taught us that all things coming from outside were a threat to our land and rights. They said that outsiders only wanted information, and that nothing good would come from them (...) Fondo Acción is the first NGO that has challenged the idea that all Caquetá communities are rebels and terrorists; they wanted to work with us, to help us understand how valuable and important we are, through the forest conservation program. They have earned our trust, and they proved that outsiders are not always the bad guys,” said Victor, a participant in Paisajes Conectados.

Methodology

The field practicum intended to determine community perceptions about the Capacity Building and Governance Strategy (CCBGS) implemented under Paisajes in the midst of a transition to peace. This qualitative and participatory assessment also identifies strengths and weaknesses of the capacity-building strategy, which can direct fine-tuning by Fondo Acción.

The approach uses semi-structured interviews and workshops with a sample of program participants from both localities. Study members have participated in Paisajes Conectados for at least six months through capacity building and governance activities and/or as beneficiaries of small grants and other program investments. The approach assumes that people are able to relate to and recognize the nine dimensions if they have enough information about the program and if the questions and instruments are clear and culturally appropriate. I applied these filters to select interviewees and workshop participants. University of Florida professors, Fondo Acción team members, and community members revised and tested the questions and workshop activities before field implementation.

I conducted the following activities:

1. Documentary review of ten relevant publications by Fondo Acción under the CCBGS.
2. Semi-structured interviews with five Fondo staff members from the Paisajes Conectados team.
3. Twenty-two semi-structured interviews with program participants (men and women between 21 and 65 years old; 65% were men) in Solano and Cartagena (Annex 1). Nine interviews in Cartagena were conducted during the Leadership School (May 17-19, 2017). Eleven interviews were conducted in Solano during the delivery of small grants (May 17-21, 2017). I had two additional interviews with the director of the Caquetá Women's Platform and with a Professor from Amazonía University. Both have been closely involved with the CCBGS since 2014.
4. One workshop with twenty participants (evenly distributed between men and women, ages 18 to 65) in Solano (Annex 2).
5. One workshop with eleven program participants (evenly distributed between men and women, ages 18 to 65) in Cartagena del Chairá (Annex 2).

Data analysis included transcribing all interviews and workshop outcomes. I treated all nine community capacity dimensions as categories of analysis and classified all answers and information in these dimensions. This is the first assessment that has been carried out with the information. Further analyses will take place during late 2018 using N-Vivo software under the advice of University of Florida professors. Therefore, the following results are preliminary and were shared with Fondo Acción before leaving Colombia in July 2017.

Results


In 2015, Fondo Acción implemented a community capacity-building and governance strategy that focused on strengthening skills and abilities relevant to sustainable natural resource management. It also trained individuals to lead and participate in public policy debates on topics such as food security, sustainable rural development, sustainable cattle ranching, gender, and conservation.

The assessment has revealed that program participants from both localities recognize the importance and usefulness of this strategy and value the skills and capacities acquired in the Field Schools (ECAs), Learning Routes, Leadership School, and workshops. Participants report that they have learned practical skills, technical abilities, and knowledge to improve farm planning, productivity, natural resource management, project design, and communication, among other things. The Leadership School has helped them take on active roles in their communities and to realize how these roles differ from FARC-style leadership. Indeed, participants highlight the importance of building new local leadership in Caquetá.

Communities are facing a two-fold challenge: managing a territory without FARC's traditional authority structures and learning to negotiate with public organizations that are knocking at the door. Practicum interviews and workshops reveal that leaders, community members, and the Fondo Acción team are aware that new skills are necessary in the post-conflict context. Communities identify the need to develop the capacity for conflict resolution, cooperation, and teamwork, as well as the need to improve mechanisms of participation.


The following graphics represent contributors' perceptions regarding community capacity. Participants were divided by village, or *vereda*, and were asked to score from 1 to 5 how much they agreed with the statements I read. Spiderweb representations, shown below, revealed perceptions regarding the nine community capacity domains (Solano includes three nodes: Herichá (1), Mononguete (2) and Las Mercedes (3); Cartagena includes three local groups).

Figure 2: Spider web representation of Solano.



Source: Author's own

Figure 3: Spider web representation of Cartagena del Chairá.



Source: Author’s own

Participation and leadership are strong attributes of both communities. The conflict has forced communities to build local leadership and empowered citizens to negotiate with legal and illegal armed actors. In fact, the decision to let Fondo Acción into their communities resulted from a long negotiation between community leaders and FARC.

Solano participants identified strengths in participation, leadership, program management, and resource mobilization. The weakest dimensions were the ability to work with others (external and internal actors) and the capacity to formulate questions (‘asking why’). The testimonies and workshop revealed two possible reasons for the first finding. For years, FARC played several roles: that of an environmental authority, an administer of justice, and a referee for everyday issues (divorces, thefts, homicides, etc.). As FARC served as the authority on social and economic matters, little space was left for autonomy or collaboration. Participants also noted that a culture of mistrust has prevented them from working with others. Regarding the ‘asking why’ dimension, participants recognized that though they inquired about benefits and subsidies offered by projects, they never delved into the political, social, or environmental consequences of these projects.

However, some of the participants acknowledged their independence in deciding whether to participate in the program. “Those of us who decided to participate in the program were called naïve. They said Fondo Acción was going to take our farms from us, that they were lying, and they encouraged people to abandon the program. We told them that before this program, nothing had come to Solano so

we had little to lose. Three years later, several families are asking to be part of it. Fondo Acción did not let us down,” said Alirio, one of the first participants in Solano.

In Cartagena del Chairá, the results were different. The strongest dimensions identified included organizational structures, problem assessment capacities, leadership skills, and the ability to collaborate with others. Participants argued that these are the result of FARC's political and social work with the Juntas de Acción Comunal (JAC)², the main local authority. “The movement (FARC) gave us health, education, technical assistance, and dedicated time and resources to help us create strong civil organizations. But we were the ones who decided to let them (Paisajes Conectados) come to Cartagena, not FARC,” said Ricardo, a member of the Cartagena community.

After the peace agreement was signed in 2016, Cartagena del Chairá communities decided to keep the organizational structure in place because they considered it an effective mechanism to deal with the central government's programs and institutions. The Cartagena participants report that their capacity to work with others is a core value of their community and that it has resulted from the foundation laid by FARC. Thus, collaborating with other JACs and organizations is common practice.

Another finding from the interviews and workshops was the role of women. According to program data, most of the participants in Paisajes Conectados are women. This is uncommon in Caquetá's male-dominated society and culture, according to the Women's Platform. Women were more willing to join the program, motivated their male partners to participate, and encouraged other women and local organizations to trust Fondo Acción. Most of the male interviewees acknowledged that they did not believe in the program and its activities; this perception changed when their wives began receiving materials, small grants, and training in sustainable agriculture, and when they witnessed how women readily participated in program-related design and decision-making.

Conclusions

Before the peace agreement was signed, many observers asserted that the biggest obstacle to peace would be assuring the implementation of various provisions of the agreement. While the uncertainties related to post-conflict implementation of the peace agreement are important, even more significant for achieving a lasting, durable peace in Colombia is progress towards sustainable development goals. Initiatives like the Paisajes Conectados program provide important lessons concerning best practices for sustainable development, which can in turn inform similar development initiatives in other former conflict territories. The field practicum conducted in Caquetá is one of the first efforts to carry out academic research on communities in former FARC-controlled areas. How have these communities fared after years of war and isolating conditions? How can they deploy the social capital

² JAC is a mechanism of participation that enables people from villages and neighborhoods to organize themselves to promote development projects (Interior Minister, 2017).

developed during the conflict to ensure that they will be able to more effectively manage their natural resources in an era of peace? The field practicum report provides important information that helps decision makers better understand the local context and craft development interventions.

The field practicum findings also show that changes in Solano and Cartagena del Chairá's systems have been mainly influenced by outsiders. However, the social capital, mindset transformations, and knowledge produced by the communities through the Paisajes Conectados program can provide them with pathways to communicate their history and future vision for Caquetá with outsiders. Their vision is one of peacebuilding and forest protection, to leave future generations with the possibility of sustainable livelihoods. To implement the peace agreement and sustainable development goals, the Colombian government must listen to communities that were deeply affected by the armed conflict and take full advantage of environmental project outcomes. The government must acknowledge the social capital developed by these communities during the conflict, represented in the community capacity domains. Finally, it is important to build bridges and synergy among communities, NGOs, and local governments to produce policies and programs that will help strengthen community capacity and conservation efforts going forward.

Acknowledgments

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Annex 1

Interviews with people of the community

1. Can you please give me your full name?
2. How long do you live in Caquetá?
3. Were you born in the region? If you don't How did you arrive to Caquetá?
4. What the thing that you like the most about the region?
5. What attributes have the people of your community?
6. What do you cultivate in your farm, what animals do you have?
7. How do you find out about Paisajes Conectados and Fondo Acción?
8. What is the purpose of the program?
9. What kind of vinculation do you have with Paisajes Conectados (employee, beneficiary)?
10. How long do you work in the program's activities?
11. How was this place before Paisjes Conectados started?
12. Regarding the activities, you have worked, is there anyone that you remember the most? Why?
13. Where do you traditionally gather for the meetings and activities?
14. Who participate in these activities? Do you remember somebody in particular?
15. If you can tell me the three things that the program has taught you, what would it be?
16. How have your life changed since you are in the program?
17. Who makes the decision about what is going to be made in the community?
18. Can you please describe how was and how is the process to implement a project in the community?
19. How would you describe the work that the community is doing with with Fondo Acción
20. What do you like about the work with this organization?
21. What do you want to be different? Why?
22. Which are the most important resources that the community give to participate in the programs or projects (time, logistics, food)?
23. Do you work with other organizations? If yes how is the relationship with them?
24. How have your life changed since your are in the program?
25. How do you imagine the region in a couple of years?
26. What should happen in order to make the think you imagine real?
27. Any final comment that you want to add

Annex 2

Community workshop

Objective: To identify what dimensions from the community capacity approach have materialized in the communities of Caquetá that have been beneficiaries of Fondo Accion's interventions.

Target population: Men and women between 18 and 70 years-old.

Time: 4 hours

- The activity will be recorded all the time

Workshop Guide

1. **Greetings (10 min):**
When people arrive, the facilitator gives each person a name tag to write his/her name.
2. **Icebreaker Name and throw (20 min):** To help learn another's name in an enjoyable and non-threatening manner. Participants make a circle, and the facilitator says her name and throws a ball to another person. The second person says his name and throws the ball. This process continues until everyone has said their names and threw the ball. After two rounds, facilitator throws the second ball in the same order she did the first time. Participants must be aware of saying their name and throwing the ball in the order they did the first time. In the end, the circle will have three balls and will force that participants be aware to say their name and throw the ball in a specific order.
Materials: 3 balls
3. **Meeting objectives and establishing rules of participation (15 min):**The facilitator takes the objectives written on flip chart paper to the meeting, and puts them in a visible location after participants sit after the first activity. To establish the rules for participating, the facilitator asks the people to write what they think the rules should be on a piece of colored paper, and then to tape the paper onto the wall. When everyone has finished his/her paper, the facilitator asks which is the most important paper on the wall, and on another piece of flip chart paper writes down what people say. At the end, the facilitator will ask them if they are comfortable following the rules of participation written on the flip chart.
4. **Exercise #1 (60 min): Spider web representation:** The objective of the activity: To identify what dimensions of the CCB are acknowledged by the beneficiaries of Fondo Acción's projects and the why they acknowledged them. The facilitator asks each participant to fill in the matrix individually (below). After 15 minutes the facilitator divides the group into three smaller groups and provides instructions to fill in the matrix again together in a flip chart. After 30 minutes, the facilitator asks the small groups to make a round table and present the form. Meanwhile, the facilitator takes notes. Once small groups finish the presentations of their matrices, the moderator closes with the ideas that come up from the activity. Materials: matrix prints, markers, stickers, pens, tape, note-taking poster, 3 big spider webs.
5. **Transition between activities (5 min):** Moderator goes around the circle and asks participants which of the dimensions are more important for them to make better community decisions.
6. **Exercise #2 (80 min): Social mapping and timeline:** Objective of the activity: To identify what places have been used and what activities have occurred in the projects that are acknowledged by the community.

6.1 Participants sit around a table and the facilitator gives them a flip chart. Then, she asks the group to organize themselves into a line from the earliest (January) birthday to the latest (December). Once they have formed a line, the moderator asks them to take a marker and draw on the paper when the program starts, what activities they remember and when did they meet the last time. When they finish, the facilitator asks participants to discuss the timeline.

6.2 Energizer: “All move who...”: Stand or sit on chairs, in a circle, with one person (Facilitator first) in the middle. Say ‘All move who...’ and then add, for example: are wearing something blue; traveled more than a day to get there; got up this morning before 4 am.

6.3 The facilitator divides the groups again into two groups: men and women. The moderator gives a map of Solano and asks each group to draw the places (church, school, community center) where they have had activities of the projects and identify what activities they have developed in those places. After 30 minutes, the facilitator asks them to present their work and comment on them. Meanwhile, the facilitator takes notes. Once small groups finish the presentation, the facilitator makes a closing with the ideas that came up from the activity. Materials: 2 big copies of Solano's map, markers, note-taking poster

7. **Break (15 min):** NGO will provide the snacks for the break.
8. **Final reflection (30 min):** Objective of the activity: To summarize and clarify ideas that have come up from the activities. Considering the activities that were made, the facilitator asks some clarifying questions about the activities and asks the participants to give a conclusion about the results of the activities, community's characteristics, and the skills they have honed through the project's.

(Dimension)	(Statement)	(Grade)	(What are the reasons for this grade?)
Participación (Participation)	<i>(Participation is mandatory for the empowerment of the community. Participating in large or small spaces, people from the community can reflect, analyze and act in the issues that are important for the community)</i>		
(leadership)	<i>(Leadership in the community is exerted by different people in the community such as women, men, young, elders, indigenous, and it</i>		

	<i>allows the development of the community)</i>		
	<i>(People who are acknowledged as leaders enable community to have more support from other organizations, access to resources (economic, material) and better understanding among the people who belong to it)</i>		
<i>(Organizational structures)</i>	<i>(Community involves different actors as the church, school teachers, Young people, women organizations to analyze the problems of the community and propose solutions)</i>		
<i>(Problem assesment)</i>	<i>(Community is able to identify the causes and solutions to the problems it has)</i>		
<i>(Resource mobilization)</i>	<i>(Community is able to mobilize resources (human, financial, materials) inside and outside of the community to manage solutions to the problems that affect it)</i>		
<i>(Asking why)</i>	<i>(Before making a decision, the community is able to inquiry about the political, economic and social consequences that could arise from the decision it makes)</i>		
<i>(Links with others)</i>	<i>(Community is able to manage alliances with other communities or organizations to develop or implement their projects)</i>		
<i>(Role of the outside agents)</i>	<i>(Community is able to work with external organizations like the local government, non-profit organizations, private companies to mobilize resources and technical support for developing their own projects and activities)</i>		

(Programme management)	<i>Community has the control, independence and power to decide over the design, implementation and evaluation of the programs and projects that are implemented in their territories)</i>		
	<i>(community has roles in its organization to manage the projects and the decision-making process)</i>		

*Adapted from (Gibbon, Labonte and Laverack, Evaluating community capacity 2002)